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CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE OPERATIONAL MODELS FOR 




The Northern Sea Route (NSR) has received increased international attention 
during the recent years as an alternative transit corridor for shipping between Europe 
and East Asia. In 2015, the project “Feasibility and Reliability of Shipping on the 
Northern Sea Route and Modeling of an Arctic Marine Transportation & Logistics 
System” was established to perform a comprehensive analysis of the current status 
and future prospects of NSR transit shipping. The project brought together several 
partners and numerous participants representing industry, governmental bodies, and 
research groups from Europe, Asia, and Russia, thus providing a unique and 
comprehensive overview of the subject. This paper is based on the insights gathered 
during the project. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive overview of the NSR’s current 
regulations and support services. Secondly, it combines the information on the current 
status of the route with feedback received from the stakeholders during project 
discussions for the purpose of establishing several possible future operational models 
for transit shipping along the NSR. It is concluded that the most probable of the 
analyzed operational models is a combination of ice-strengthened vessels and 
independent ice-going cargo vessels. This model requires a decrease in severity of ice 
conditions to allow for year-round commercial navigation, an increase in bunker 
prices, further development of maritime infrastructure and icebreaking support, and 
the development of new maritime insurance models. Additionally, establishing 
transshipment hubs at each end of the NSR with ice-going cargo vessels sailing 
between them is also considered to be a viable future option. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Northern Sea Route (NSR)1 presents a potential shortcut for transit 
shipping2 between Europe and East Asia, which can be used in order to save fuel 
and/or time (see Østreng et al., 2013 for details about shipping along the NSR). In 
recent decades, the reduction of ice extent and thickness in the Arctic resulted in 
increased international interest in using the NSR for intercontinental shipping (DNV, 
2010). Specifically, in 2010, Tschudi Shipping and its partners realized the first 
international transit voyage along the NSR resulting in costs savings (Tschudi, 2010). 
This event triggered a surge of interest for the NSR amongst non-Russian shipowners 
resulting in a rise in the annual number of commercial transit voyages along the NSR, 
culminating in 71 transits in 2013 (transit statistics available at www.arctic-lio.com). 
In the following years, however, the number of transit voyages decreased again due to 
various reasons, such as reduced bunker prices, geopolitical circumstances, cargo 
unavailability, ice conditions, etc. 
Transit shipping along the NSR has been extensively studied throughout the 
years. In recent years, several studies have discussed the current status and future 
prospects of the NSR transit shipping from different perspectives. Marchenko (2014) 
presented an overview of historical development of the NSR together with the current 
status of various shipping-related aspects. Bekkers et al. (2016), Kiiski et al. (2016), 
Pruyn (2016) and Zhang et al. (2016a) discussed future prospects of NSR transit 
shipping from a techno-economic perspective. Jianmin et al. (2015) analyzed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “The area of the Northern Sea Route means a water area adjoining the northern coast 
of the Russian Federation, including internal sea waters, territorial sea, contiguous 
zone and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, and limited in the East 
by the line delimitating the sea areas with the United States of America and by the 
parallel of the Dezhnev Cape in the Bering Strait; in the West, by the meridian of the 
Cape Zhelanie to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, by the east coastal line of the 
Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the western limits of the Matochkin Shar, Kara 
Gates, Yugorski Shar Straits.” (definition adopted from The Federal Law of July 28, 
2012, N 132-FZ "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation Concerning State Regulation of Merchant Shipping on the Water Area of 
the Northern Sea Route") 
2 The term “transit shipping” applies for using the NSR for sailing between 
continents. Due to the lack of intermediate hubs along the NSR resulting from the 
lack of hinterland in the Russian Arctic, only cargo going directly from Europe to 
East Asia (or vice-versa) is considered eligible for transit shipping via the NSR. The 
NSR can also be used for destination shipping (e.g. supporting energy projects in the 
Russian Arctic), but that is not the focus of this paper.  
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potential of container shipping through the NSR, while Cariou and Faury (2015) 
discussed bulk shipping. Zhang et al. (2016b) discussed the NSR transit shipping 
from the shipowners’ perspective, while Lee and Kim (2015) performed a similar 
analysis focusing on three South Korean shipping companies. Kim (2015) discussed 
South Korea’s Master Plan for the development of Arctic shipping, while Zhao et al. 
(2016) discussed China-EU container shipping network in the context of the NSR. 
Beveridge et al. (2016) discussed general interest of Asian shipping companies in 
navigating the Arctic.  
These studies provide valuable insights from their own perspectives. However, 
an integrated study comprising of insights from stakeholders from different fields and 
from all three regions involved – Europe, Asia, and Russia – is currently missing. 
This is especially true regarding accurate and up-to-date information from the Russian 
side, which is scarce in the literature. 
The project “Feasibility and Reliability of Shipping on the Northern Sea Route 
and Modeling of an Arctic Marine Transportation & Logistics System” was 
established in 2015 to address this issue and provide a more complete picture of the 
current state and future perspectives of transit shipping along the NSR. The project 
was initiated by Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL, www.chnl.no) of the Nord 
University in Bodø, Norway and the Institute of Arctic Logistics (IAL) of the 
Youngsan University in Busan, South Korea. The project was funded by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Norway (ARCTIC 2030 Programme) on one side and by the 
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of South Korea on the other. The project lasted from 
April 2015 until December 2016 as a joint research venture of CHNL and IAL with 
the following project partners: Federal State Unitary Enterprise (FSUE) Rosatomflot, 
Murmansk, Russia; Department of Marine Technology at the Norwegian University 
of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway; DNV GL, Høvik (Oslo), 
Norway; and Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, Oslo, Norway. The project was 
organized in a series of six one-day workshops held in Norway and South Korea, with 
the goal to perform a comprehensive analysis of the current commercial transport and 
logistics operations, operational efficiency, cargo base, costs, infrastructure needs, and 
security and safety of transit shipping along the NSR. At each workshop, project 
partners presented their research on different topics, followed by the discussions. In 
addition to project partners listed above, workshops brought together various 
participants from industry and academia, including representatives of Norwegian 
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academic institutions; international oil & gas companies; Norwegian and Finnish ship 
owners with experience in NSR sailing; South Korean shipyards; Norwegian 
Protection & Indemnity (P&I) company; and political authorities of South Korea. 
Additionally, interviews with several important stakeholders (mainly on the Russian, 
Norwegian and South Korean side) who were unable to participate at the workshops 
were conducted by the project partners, insights from which were included in their 
presentations. Consequently, this combination of partners and participants from 
different fields and regions of the world – Europe, Asia, and Russia – provided a new 
and more complete perspective on the subject of NSR transit shipping. 
This paper is based on the insights gathered during the project and uses them 
as a basis for establishing future operational models for transit shipping along the 
NSR. Section 2 presents an overview of the NSR’s current regulations and support 
services based on the publicly available information and on the knowledge collected 
during the project. The challenges identified by the project partners and participants 
are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, different future operational models for transit 
shipping along the NSR are studied. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  NSR’S CURRENT REGULATIONS AND SUPPORT SERVICES 
 
During the project discussions, it became apparent that there is still a lack of 
information amongst non-Russian shipowners regarding various aspects of the NSR 
transit shipping. This section tries to reduce this knowledge-gap by providing a 
comprehensive overview of the existing data and adding to it with the information 
gathered during the project. 
 
2.1 Rules and regulations governing the NSR shipping 
 
2.1.1 Russian rules and regulations  
 
Since the opening of the NSR for international traffic in 1991, the Russian 
Federation has been continuously developing rules and regulations governing 
shipping along the NSR (for details on historical development of the regulations see 
Solski, 2013). 
The year 2013 marked the beginning of a new era for the NSR, mainly 
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through the implementation of the “New Rules of Navigation on the NSR” (Rules of 
navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, 2013). Also, “The Northern 
Sea Route Administration Office” (NSRA, www.nsra.ru) was reorganized and 
established in its current form the same year. The aim of the 2013 rules was to 
simplify administrative procedures and processing of applications for the NSR sailing 
permit, issued by the NSRA. Table 1 presents an overview of the most important 
changes to come out of the new regulations and bureaucratic reorganization 
implemented in 2013.  
 
Table 1, Comparison of NSR regulations before and after 2013  
Before 2013 After 2013 
Every vessel intending to navigate through the NSR – either for destination shipping 
or transit – shall obtain a sailing permit. 
Ship’s master or person replacing him shall be experienced in operating а vessel in 
ice. 
Obligatory requirements to have Civil Liability Certificate for oil pollution. 
Shipowners intending to use the NSR 
should submit a request for a sailing 
permit to the Administration of the NSR 
at least 4 months in advance. 
The application for the sailing permit 
with all necessary documents attached is 
to be sent to the NSRA via e-mail no 
earlier than 120 calendar days and no 
later than 15 working days before the 
intended date of the entering of the ship 
into the NSR water area. 
Mandatory ship inspection. Ship inspection not needed, only documents sent by e-mail. 
Vessel must have at least Arc4 or 1-A 
ice class (for transit). 
Flexible system. Admittance criteria 
dependent on season, ice class, NSR area, 
and actual ice conditions. 
Mandatory icebreaker (IB) assistance. 
IB assistance can be either mandatory or 
optional depending on prevailing ice 
conditions.  
Calculation of IB assistance costs 
reached through negotiations. 
Calculation of IB assistance costs 
according to tariff tables, which present 
maximal allowable tariffs. Still, the 
operator has freedom to reduce the price 
if deemed justified. 
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2.1.2 Admittance criteria for the NSR sailing Permit 
 
For a shipowner to use the NSR for transit shipping, it is necessary to obtain 
the NSR sailing permit, which is issued by the NSRA and is free of charge. The 
shipowner applies for the sailing permit by submitting the voyage details through the 
application portal on the NSRA’s website. The application for the sailing permit is 
then considered by the NSRA and a decision is made within 10 working days. The 
admittance criteria regarding ice conditions, NSR’s navigational zones, vessel’s ice 
class, mode of sailing (with or without IB support), and sailing season can be found in 
the Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route (2013).  
The most common reasons for refusal of issuance of the NSR sailing permit 
are:  
• Some or all of the submitted documents are expired. 
• The documents will expire before the period of the planned navigation on the 
NSR. 
• Planned area of navigation is beyond the permitted area as specified by the 
classification certificate. 
• Attachments to the application for the sailing permit are not provided. The 
application is not filled out or filled incorrectly (dates or routes of navigation 
are indicated improperly). 
 
2.1.3 International rules and regulations  
 
The main international regulating bodies relevant for the NSR are the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), together with international conventions 
UNCLOS, SOLAS, MARPOL, and STCW (see e.g. Buixadé Farré et al., 2014 for 
more details on international rules and legislation). In January 2017, IMO’s Polar 
Code (IMO, 2017) came into force introducing new safety requirements for ships 
sailing in polar waters. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian 
Federation made the Polar Code’s certificates (Polar Ship Certificate, Polar Water 
Operational Manual, and Qualification of Deck Officers) a mandatory requirement for 
issuance of the NSR sailing permit (www.arctic-lio.com/node/266). This is expected 
to have a positive effect on safety and long-term sustainability of NSR shipping, 
reducing risks and aligning Russian rules and regulations with international standards. 
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2.1.4 Maritime insurance for vessels sailing along the NSR 
 
According to AMSA (2009), Arctic shipping will not be sustainable without 
the availability of marine insurance at reasonable commercial rates. Regular Hull & 
Machinery (H&M) insurances do not offer coverage in latitudes above 70° North 
(“excluded trading areas”) or in areas such as the Barents, White, Chukchi, and 
Okhotsk Seas. There, special arrangements are required with the insurer, including 
additional Hull premiums. Currently there are no additional premiums or restrictions 
on the P&I coverage for sailing in the Arctic, despite increased marine liability risks 
in these areas. According to Russian legislation, P&I insurance is required for foreign 
ships sailing along the NSR. The insurance market is currently not charging additional 
premiums for cargoes on Arctic trade routes under a worldwide policy. For special 
cargoes, perceived additional Arctic exposure is likely to be taken into account in the 
original rating. Still, due to limited number of transit voyages, the risks of sailing the 
NSR are difficult to calculate for the insurance companies. 
 
2.2 Sailing in ice and icebreaker support 
 
2.2.1 Classification of ice conditions 
 
Ice conditions along the NSR are evaluated by the Arctic and Antarctic 
Research Institute (AARI, www.aari.ru). The ice charts are available on the NSRA’s 
website and updated on a regular basis. Ice conditions are classified as: “heavy” (20% 
more severe ice conditions than multi-year averages for certain part of the route and 
season); “medium” (multi-year average ice conditions for certain part of the route and 
season); and “low” (20% less severe ice conditions than multi-year averages for 
certain part of the route and season), see Mironov (2013) for details on classification 
of ice conditions. The ship’s master can obtain both the current ice conditions as well 
as forecasts for the planned route and determine whether IB assistance will be 
required according to the recommendations laid out in the sailing permit (in the case 
of IB assistance being optional). 
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2.2.2 Icebreaker assistance and Rosatomflot’s tariff system 
 
IB assistance is performed by the icebreakers authorized to navigate under the 
state flag of the Russian Federation and the list of organizations providing such 
services is available on the NSRA website. Rosatomflot is the only organization 
operating nuclear-powered icebreakers and is usually employed as a convoy escort 
along the NSR since the nuclear icebreakers have the highest level of autonomy and 
icebreaking capacity (see www.rosatomflot.ru for the Rosatomflot’s nuclear IB fleet). 
In 2014, the current tariff system for the Rosatomflot’s IB services was 
established. A tariff calculator is available on the NSRA’s website and calculates the 
highest possible tariff a shipowner can be charged (note: Rosatomflot reserves the 
right to reduce the IB tariffs if needed). The tariff is based on the following 
parameters: 
• Number of navigational zones along the NSR for which IB assistance is 
required. 
• Season of navigation. 
• Vessel’s ice class. 
• Vessel’s gross tonnage.   
 
It should be noted that the calculated tariffs are valid only for assistance provided by 
Rosatomflot and not for other providers. The tariffs are valid both for destination and 
transit shipping along the NSR and apply only to escort services. Other IB services 
(e.g. salvage operations, icebreaking to provide port access, assistance to vessels stuck 
in ice, etc.) are not regulated by the tariff system.  
 
2.2.3 Ice pilots/navigators  
 
In the case that a ship’s master has insufficient experience navigating in ice 
along the NSR, an ice pilot needs to be present on the bridge. Such a requirement is 
stated in the sailing permit. The purpose of ice pilot’s assistance is to ensure the safe 
navigation through the NSR, prevent accidents, and protect the marine environment in 
the water area of the NSR. The rates for ice pilot assistance along the NSR have not 
yet been officially determined. In practice, approximately 1000 USD per day, per 
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person has been charged. A list of organizations providing ice pilotage services is 
available on the NSRA’s website. 
 
2.2.4 Russia’s icebreaker fleet 
 
Out of approximately 80 icebreakers in operation worldwide, more than 40 are 
sailing under the state flag of the Russian Federation. Most of these are diesel-
powered icebreakers and only five are nuclear icebreakers.  
Presently, both nuclear and diesel icebreakers are mainly engaged in 
supporting energy projects in the Russian Arctic (e.g. Yamal LNG). The support of 
transit shipping along the NSR currently accounts for only a small portion of IBs’ 
services. However, if the number of transit voyages increases in the future, the IB 
operators will have to find a mode of operation that satisfies the needs of both local 
energy projects and trans-Arctic shipping. 
The operators are currently renewing and improving their icebreaking 
capabilities. By 2021, Rosatomflot plans to add three new nuclear-powered 
icebreakers to their fleet (www.rosatom.ru/en/rosatom-group/the-nuclear-icebreaker-
fleet/); each with 60 MW of installed power and capable of breaking ice up to 2.9 m 
thick. Plans to build even more powerful nuclear icebreakers of the Lider class with 
110 or 120 MW installed power, a width of 50 m, and capable of breaking ice up to 
4.5 m thick have recently been delayed due to budgetary reasons. Nevertheless, 
building IBs with increased width is important for the future development of the NSR 
transit shipping as they can create even wider channels, allowing larger vessels to 
enter the NSR thus taking advantage of economy of scale.  
The latest diesel-powered IB project is the development of IB Viktor 
Chernomyrdin for the state-owned company Rosmorport. This is going to be the 
world’s largest and most powerful diesel-powered icebreaker with 25 MW of installed 
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2.3 Maritime infrastructure, safety, and navigational support for shipping along 
the NSR 
 
Historically, the driving forces behind the development of the NSR were 
internal Soviet (and later Russian) interests and the needs of the economy. Therefore, 
the NSR has never really been integrated into the world’s shipping market and its 
scarce infrastructure struggles to meet the requirements of the modern shipping 
industry. As of today, 18 ports exist in the Russian Arctic (see Figure 1), the most 
significant of these being Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Sabetta, and Dudinka (note: only 
Murmansk, Archangelsk, Vitino, Sabetta, and Pevek are currently open for 
international transport).  
The development of the NSR’s infrastructure and supporting services is 
included in the Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2030 (see 
Shcherbanin, 2013 and www.government.ru/en/dep_news/13191/ for details). 
Furthermore, there is a plan to develop Murmansk into a major transport hub, with 
planned construction of oil and coal terminals, container terminal, facilities to handle 
fertilizers, and a new railroad (www.rosmorport.com/mur_developmentofports.html). 
Planning is underway to develop Dvina Gulf (located on the White Sea 55 km north 
of the city of Arkhangelsk) into new deep-water seaport, operating year-round and 
servicing vessels up to 100,000 dwt and transporting up to 30 million tons of cargo 
annually by 2030 (www.rosmorport.com/arf_developmentofports.html). Container 
shipping is seen as a key component of the new port. 
 
 
Figure 1, Russian Arctic ports 
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Obtaining exact information on the current status of the NSR’s infrastructure 
and support services is currently challenging for non-Russian shipowners. Therefore, 
CHNL has initiated the development of the first interactive map of the NSR’s 
infrastructure, the initial version of which is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2, Snapshot of CHNL’s NSR infrastructure map 
 
2.3.1 Search and Rescue (SAR)  
 
The large area, combined with limited SAR infrastructure and harsh weather 
conditions that can cause long response times in critical situations, presents a major 
challenge for successful SAR operations in the Arctic. Therefore, vessels operating in 
Arctic waters must have high level of autonomy. 
Still, with the exception of the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea, the SAR 
infrastructure is better along the NSR than elsewhere within the Arctic Ocean. 
Currently, four general emergency response centers are fully operational in Naryan-
Mar, Arkhangelsk, Dudinka, and Murmansk. In addition, there are several centers 
specifically dedicated to maritime SAR along the NSR (see the NSRA’s website for 
details): 
	   12 
• The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Dikson operates year-
round and is equipped with rescue vessels, boats, and long-range aircrafts. 
• The Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre (MRSC) in Tiksi operates from July till 
October, and is equipped with rescue vessels and boats, long-range aircrafts, 
and light helicopters. 
• The MRSC in Pevek also operates from July till October, and is similarly 
equipped with rescue vessels and boats, long-range aircrafts, and light and 
medium-sized helicopters. 
 
2.3.2 Navigational aids and communication challenges  
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, state funding for navigational aids 
declined dramatically and NSR’s navigational support system operated at the 
minimum safety level until 2010. During the recent years, the situation has improved 
significantly: Navigational aids for the NSR area now consist of approximately 730 
navigational charts (including 233 in English), 1240 coastal visual signs, and 300 
floating markers. There are also ice pilot books for different NSR navigational zones 
that provide support for navigation in ice along the NSR.  
Recently, the main focus of hydrographic research has been the development 
and opening of high-latitude tracks for larger vessels with drafts of up to 18 m. Maps 
showing minimal water depth for different routes along the entire NSR have been 
made available by Russian authorities. This helps independently sailing shipowners 
(i.e. without IB support) to select safe routes without the risk of entering low draft 
areas.  
As for the hydro-meteorological services, the NSRA continuously provides the 
following information on its website:    
• Seasonal forecasts of sea ice conditions within the NSR’s 7 navigational zones 
for the first and second period of summer/fall navigation. 
• Short-term forecasts of sea ice conditions. 
• Sea ice charts for the NSR’s water area. 
• Synoptic charts (diagnostic and forecast), showing air pressure, precipitation, 
wind, wave height, ocean current, and temperature distribution in waters of the 
Russian Arctic. 
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Communication challenges on the NSR are mainly related to the fact that 
service reliability based on geostationary satellites is reduced when passing 72°N 
latitude, furthermore, service cannot be considered reliable in areas above 75°N. 
Therefore, numerous signal-enhancing stations have been established along the NSR, 
providing increased reliability of satellite services. Still, it is not uncommon for a 
satellite signal to be lost in high latitudes, indicating the need for further 
improvements of service reliability. Radio centers and coastal stations provide 
unhampered and free reception and transmission of alarm messages, unscheduled 
navigation notifications, and storm warnings to the addressees, regardless of their 
location.  
 
2.3.3 Oil spill preparedness 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the Arctic ecosystem, oil spill preparedness (OSP) is 
an important part of the NSR’s logistics system. The presence of sea ice affects the 
behavior of oil spills (see e.g. Afenyo et al. 2015 for more details on oil spills in ice 
covered waters). Russian state laws require operators to pay for the cost of cleanup 
operations and environmental damage in the case of an oil spill. The damages to the 
marine environment caused by an oil spill within the NSR area are calculated using 
methods approved by the Ministry of Nature Resources and Ecology of Russia and 
the Federal Agency of Fisheries (Bambulyak et al., 2014).  
The Marine Rescue Service (MRS) manages both response and recovery 
operations in case of an oil spill from a ship within the NSR area. Oil spill response 
equipment is located in the ports of Dikson, Tiksi, Pevek, and Provideniya. Still, the 
most effective component of the Russian OSP system are the IBs, as they are 
expected to be the first ones to reach the location of an oil spill. Out of them, IBs 
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3. CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED BY THE PROJECT PARTNERS AND 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
One of the key aspects of the project was to receive feedback from project 
partners and participants on challenges related to the use of the NSR for transit 
shipping. In order to model future development of the route, it is crucial to understand 
the main issues that the different stakeholders are facing in their operations. This 
section summarizes the project partners’ and participants’ comments and opinions 
gathered during the discussions, which are sorted under several topics presented 
below.  
 
3.1 Ice conditions 
 
There was a general consensus amongst the industry stakeholders that year-
round operations are necessary for the NSR transit shipping to be profitable. This is 
mainly due to the perceived unprofitability of investing in a fleet of ice-strengthened 
vessels3 that can only operate along the NSR during the summer season under the 
current ice conditions. During the winter/spring season, these ice-strengthened vessels 
would have to sail in open-water (e.g. along the Suez Canal Route) – a sailing mode 
for which they are not optimal (see e.g. Erikstad and Ehlers, 2012). On the other hand, 
current ice conditions during the winter/spring season require prohibitively expensive 
investments in ice-going cargo vessels4 that would be needed for year-round 
operations. Moreover, ice conditions in the eastern parts of the NSR are currently so 
harsh during winter that even the technical feasibility of such operations is 
questionable. To illustrate the point, the ice-going LNG carriers designed for the 
Yamal LNG project may only sail westwards from Sabetta during winter.  
The uncertainty related to future ice conditions in the Arctic also presents a 
significant obstacle for shipowners. Shipowners have to evaluate their Arctic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ice-strengthened vessels cannot break ice on their own. They can only sail in very 
light ice conditions independently, or through a brash ice channel created by an 
icebreaker.	  
4 Ice-going vessels can sail independently in ice without icebreaker support except in 
heaviest ice conditions. 
For details on types of vessels sailing in ice, see Riska (2010).	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operations for several possible future ice conditions, adding additional complexity to 
their long-term planning. 
 
3.2 Bunker prices 
 
The recent drop in bunker prices has weakened the competitiveness of the 
NSR compared to other sailing routes, e.g. the Suez Canal Route, which was 
recognized during the project discussions. The NSR can be used as a shortcut that 
allows for considerable fuel savings, but this advantage becomes less important when 
bunker prices decrease. The decline of interest in the NSR after 2013 can therefore 
also be attributed, at least in part, to the reduction in bunker prices during the same 
period. 
 
3.3 Russian legislation, icebreaker assistance and maritime infrastructure 
 
One of the key insights from the project is that there is still a lack of 
knowledge outside of Russia regarding Russian legislation governing NSR shipping. 
For example, several project participants expressed surprise when informed of the fact 
that Russian regulations allow sailing the NSR during the summer/fall navigational 
season without IB assistance, if the ice conditions are favorable and/or the vessel has 
an appropriate ice class – thus basically sailing the NSR for free. Generally, with the 
2013 rules in place, the administrative obstacles for the international use of the NSR 
for transit shipping have been considerably reduced. 
Russia is currently planning to make substantial financial investments in the 
future development of the NSR, both in terms of IB support and infrastructural 
development. However, shipowners seem reluctant to make significant investments 
and plan their long-term operations using the NSR before the intended infrastructural 
projects are realized.  
Concern was expressed during discussions over liability in certain 
hypothetical situations; for example, who is responsible if a vessel that had not 
previously required and had been traveling without IB support suddenly experiences 
an accident and needs help. In that case, according to Russian sources, rescue centers 
along the NSR will organize salvage operations in accordance with existing Russian 
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and international regulations, although it is unclear what the legal and financial 
repercussions may be.  
It can be challenging for a shipowner to calculate the total IB support fees 
when planning the trip several months in advance. It is difficult to anticipate how 
many NSR’s navigational zones will require IB assistance due to the unpredictability 
of future ice conditions. There have been comments from the Russian side about a 
possible willingness to adopt a different IB tariff system, if that would increase the 
interest in the NSR transit shipping.  
Concerns have been stated about the possible unavailability of IB assistance in 
case of ad hoc requests. According to Rosatomflot’s usual practice, this might indeed 
be a problem, especially for low tonnage ships since it is unprofitable to employ 
expensive IB assistance in such cases. This is amplified by the fact that most of 
Rosatomflot’s IB resources are currently employed supporting energy projects in the 
Russian Arctic. Presently, escort for transit shipping is not a priority. Consequently, 
Rosatomflot plans transit convoys based on their largest customers’ needs, which can 
be unfavorable for smaller shipowners as they might have to adjust their schedules, 
thus loosing flexibility.  
IB tariffs are calculated in Russian rubles so the cost is strongly related to 
USD/RUR exchange ratio, which is a significant uncertainty when planning for long-
term operations.  
There was an idea mentioned during discussions about the possibilities of 
using non-Russian IBs for assistance along the NSR. Currently, only Russian IBs are 
allowed to provide assistance along the NSR. However, there have been no attempts 
so far to use non-Russian IB assistance.  
One shipowner stated that there was interest in investing in an ice capable fleet 
for the Arctic operations, but the questionable availability of IB assistance was a 
project stopper.  
All partners and participants agreed that additional investments into NSR 
infrastructure are required to support the shipping operations. This especially goes for 
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3.4 Maritime insurance 
 
Sailing the NSR without IB support (independently) is allowed under Russian 
rules during the summer/fall season if the ice conditions are favorable. However, 
insurance companies might restrict independent sailing for non-Russian shipowners in 
some cases (even if the ice conditions allow it), since the IBs currently provide the 
most efficient support in case of vessel damage. During the discussions, it has been 
stated that there is a need for independent voyages to be insured, since the operational 
window for this mode of sailing has become significant during the summer/fall 
season. This initiative has been supported by the knowledge that the Russian 
authorities will organize salvage operations (including Rosatomflot’s assistance if 
needed) for independently sailing vessels as well.  
A representative of a P&I insurance company present during the discussion 
indicated that they would most likely insure independent sailing if the H&M 
insurance company would as well.  
Insurance companies consider remoteness to be a larger risk than sea ice. The 
lack of ports of refuge and repair facilities as well as limited availability of rescue 
facilities are mentioned as major obstacles for the development of NSR transit 
shipping. While the number of reported incidents remains low, even small accident 
becomes very expensive due to remoteness. Furthermore, the lack of reliable 
statistical data, due to the limited number of voyages, presents an additional problem 
when calculating risk, which is the base for calculating insurance premiums.  
 
4. FUTURE OPERATIONAL MODELS FOR TRANSIT SHIPPING ALONG 
THE NSR 
 
4.1 Definition of operational models (OMs) 
 
Assuming that the NSR is to become a viable transit route in the future, there 
are different ways in which it could be developed. From a shipowners’ perspective, 
different operational models (OMs) could be used to utilize the NSR as an inter-
continental transit corridor. The term OM defines the mode of utilization of the NSR 
with respect to ice capabilities of the fleet and/or requirements for IB assistance. In 
this section, such OMs are defined and analyzed based on the current status of the 
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route and on the feedback received from the project partners and participants. The 
analyzed OMs are:      
• OM0 – Ice-strengthened vessels with/without IB support (seasonal 
navigation): 
The NSR is utilized in the same manner as today, meaning that ice-
strengthened vessels are transiting the NSR with or without the IB assistance 
during summer/fall season, depending on the ice conditions (currently, the 
majority of vessels sailing along the NSR for the purpose of destination 
shipping are sailing without IB support during the most favorable part of the 
summer/fall season when waters are ice-free; in fact, many of these ships 
either have no ice class or very low ice-strengthening). 
• OM1 – Ice-strengthened vessels with/without IB support (year-round 
navigation):  
Similar to OM0 with the difference being that the ice conditions allow for 
year-round navigation. IB assistance is needed during the winter/spring 
season, while sailing during summer/fall season is without IB support. 
• OM2 – Ice-strengthened vessels without IB support (year-round navigation):  
Ice conditions allow ice-strengthened vessels to sail along the NSR 
independently year-round. 
• OM3 – Independent ice-going cargo vessels (year-round navigation): 
Independent ice-going cargo vessels of a high ice class that can break ice 
independently are used. Similar to the oil tankers servicing the Arctic Gate 
Terminal in the Ob Bay or the LNG carriers servicing the Yamal LNG project 
(both with Arc7 ice class). 
• OM4 – Non-Russian IBs escorting ice-strengthened vessels (year-round 
navigation):  
Non-Russian shipowners are using their own (or contracted) IBs to escort ice-
strengthened vessels along the NSR. 
• OM5 – Transshipment hubs with ice-going cargo vessels sailing between them 
(year-round navigation):  
Intermediate transshipment hubs at each end of the NSR with ice-going cargo 
vessels sailing between the hubs in ice and with the feeders in the open water 
sections of the route. 
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4.2 Parameters influencing the feasibility of operational models 
 
The feasibility of each of the defined future OMs5 will depend on several 
influencing parameters (IPs). These IPs are identified in Section 3 and are considered 
to be the main factors affecting the future development of the NSR transit shipping. 
The IPs are viewed from the perspective of how they need to change compared to 
their current status in order for each of the OMs to become feasible. The IPs are: 
 
• IP1 – Ice conditions:  
The future development of the NSR as a transit route will mostly depend on 
the ice conditions, as it was also the case in the past. According to the ice class 
admittance criteria, ice-strengthened vessels (with ice classes Arc4 and Arc5, 
corresponding to 1A and 1A Super) are currently allowed to sail along the 
NSR during winter/spring season only under “low” severity of ice conditions, 
either independent or assisted (see Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of 
the Northern Sea Route, 2013). In other words, given current average ice 
conditions, year-round navigation of ice-strengthened vessels is not possible. 
The same goes for ice-going cargo vessels (e.g. Arc7 LNG carriers servicing 
the Yamal LNG project), which at the moment cannot commercially operate in 
the eastern parts of the NSR during winter/spring season under average ice 
conditions. Therefore, the severity of ice conditions needs to decrease in order 
for the NSR to become commercially navigable year-round. This is a 
prerequisite for all OMs apart from the OM0 and, also, a main condition 
identified by the industry stakeholders.  
• IP2 – Bunker prices: 
It is expected that bunker prices will need to increase for all of the OMs to 
become feasible since the voyage costs savings become more pronounced with 
increased bunker prices. However, it should be kept in mind that it is possible 
that the NSR will be used within operational models where time savings are 
the primary target instead of reduction of voyage costs. In that case – which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Each of the OMs can be applied for either liner or bulk shipping. However, liner 
shipping via NSR is more complicated to implement, due to strict demands on 
keeping the schedule.	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has not been considered in this analysis – the bunker prices may no longer be 
as important. 
• IP3 – Russian support (legislation, icebreakers, maritime infrastructure): 
Russian support will be necessary for all OMs. This is mainly in order to 
increase the safety and reliability of shipping along the NSR since the 
currently available infrastructure and IB support might struggle with increased 
traffic.  
• IP4 – Maritime insurance:  
Maritime insurance companies will need to create new insurance models since 
most of OMs present modes of sailing that have not been used so far. These 
new insurance models will need to capture the specifics of each OM. 
However, insuring the independent voyages, which are already possible 
nowadays during summer/fall season, needs to be the first step.  
 
The conditions of feasibility of future OMs, with respect to different IPs, are 
summarized in Table 2. The change in IPs is described qualitatively compared to their 
current status. 
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Table 2, Conditions of feasibility of future operational models for NSR transit shipping  
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4.3 Discussion of OMs 
 
As shown in Table 2, all OMs with year-round navigation require less severe 
ice conditions, increased bunker prices, improved Russian infrastructure and IB 
support, as well as new maritime insurance models. If any of these parameters 
develop in the opposite direction, they will present a significant hindrance for the 
future development of the NSR transit shipping.  
The decrease in the severity of ice conditions is considered to be the key 
prerequisite for the development of the NSR into a viable transit route in the future. 
Therefore, the choice of the most suitable future OM will mainly depend on the 
magnitude of the decrease in the severity of ice conditions. In a most favorable case 
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for shipping, ice conditions will allow independent year-round navigation of ice-
strengthened vessels, which is OM2. This scenario will require very light ice 
conditions along the NSR year-round, which is not likely to happen in the foreseeable 
future.  
However, if the severity of ice conditions gradually decreases, year-round 
commercial navigation could become possible, thus allowing OM1 and OM3 to be 
implemented. An advantage of OM1 is that it is less cost-intensive than OM3, thus 
not requiring investment in an expensive fleet of ice-going cargo vessels. On the other 
hand, advantage of OM3 lies in the fact that it does not depend on IB support. This is 
a significant benefit considering that current Russian IB capacity might struggle to 
meet the demands of NSR transit shipping if the amount of traffic significantly 
increases.  
As for OM4, the fact that shipowners would not depend on the availability of 
Russian IB support is an advantage, thus increasing the flexibility of operations. 
Issues are large investments necessary to build new IBs (although IBs currently 
operating in e.g. Baltic could be used) and operational issues of non-Russian IBs 
sailing along the NSR (crew experience, etc.). Also, currently only Russian IBs are 
allowed to provide support in the NSR water area, which presents an additional 
obstacle.  
Regarding OM5, the transshipment hubs with cargo transferring capabilities 
and ice-going cargo vessels for sailing between them are needed. This option was 
brought up several times during the project discussions and it seems that there is a 
strong interest amongst Russian authorities and stakeholders to explore this possibility 
further. Multi-purpose ships, container ships, and LNG carriers were mentioned as 
possible ice-going vessels sailing between the transshipment hubs. The advantage of 
transshipment hubs for the shipowners lies in the fact that they would not need to 
build their own ice-strengthened or ice-going cargo vessels; rather, they would only 
need to deliver the cargo in the open water to one of the hubs and collect it at the 
other end for a fee. Transshipment hubs could be used not only for transit shipping but 
also to support destination shipping along the NSR and to serve as catalysts for the 
regional development. However, the profitability of investing (and also the funding 
source) in such an advanced model needs to be further assessed. 
Naturally, any combination of the presented OMs is possible. OM1 and OM 3 
are especially compatible, as some shipowners might choose to build ice-going cargo 
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vessels while others might opt to use Russian IB support to escort their ice-
strengthened ships. The authors of this paper believe that such a solution is the most 
likely model for the future development of transit shipping along the NSR, since it 
provides the most flexibility considering the uncertainty of future ice conditions. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper, the current status of the NSR regulations and support services is 
presented based on a review of the currently available information and on the input 
gathered during the project “Feasibility and Reliability of Shipping on the Northern 
Sea Route and Modeling of an Arctic Marine Transportation & Logistics System”. 
Additionally, comments and opinions from the project partners and participants 
related to various aspects of the NSR transit shipping are presented. Finally, several 
possible future operational models for transit shipping along the NSR are established 
based on the current status of the route and on the input from project partners and 
participants.  
It is concluded that any further development of NSR transit shipping will 
require a decrease of severity of ice conditions allowing year-round commercial 
navigation, an increase in bunker prices, further development of maritime 
infrastructure and IB support along the NSR, as well as new models for maritime 
insurance. If the severity of ice conditions gradually decreases, it is concluded that the 
most probable future operational model for the NSR transit shipping is a combination 
of ice-strengthened vessels being escorted by the Russian IBs and independent ice-
going cargo vessels. Additionally, establishing transshipment hubs at each end of the 
NSR with ice-going cargo vessels sailing between them is also considered to be a 
viable option for the future. 
Future work could consist of an evaluation of each of the presented 
operational models using a transit simulator for sailing along the NSR. In that way, 
different scenarios could be quantified, allowing for a more accurate comparison 
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